Successful intervention? Critical reflections on the legacy of British military intervention in Sierra Leone

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Abstract
The estimated ratio of civilian to military deaths in intrastate conflict numbered 9 in 10 at the end of the 20th Century. This implies a salient need for humanitarian intervention in order to alleviate human suffering. However, military intervention for humanitarian purposes, a manifestation of the Responsibility to Protect, remains a contentious issue within security studies as much debate surrounds the legitimacy of an international body holding sovereign states accountable for abuses of its citizens. The decade long conflict in Sierra Leone is often cited as one of the most brutal in recent history and the subsequent British military intervention hailed as a success story by the international community. In the context of British politics it is often referred to as Blair’s successful war, politically justified by his foreign policy with an ethical dimension. However, the ethics of this intervention remain contentious, having displayed clear unilateralism and partiality. In addition, relatively little extensive research has been conducted into the long-term effects of military intervention for humanitarian purposes on peacebuilding and stability, with the majority instead focused on the immediate structural and theoretical level. As a result there exists a significant gap in knowledge. This paper reflects on the legacy of a “successful” unilateral military intervention and seeks to make an original contribution to these current voids in literature. The implications for the Responsibility to Protect, as well as the domestic and global legacy resulting from the British intervention, will also be discussed.

Keywords: Responsibility to protect, military intervention, legacy
Introduction

Recent military interventions for humanitarian purposes represent a manifestation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P); a principle rooted in the belief of an ethical obligation to intervene in instances of “genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing” (United Nations, 2005: 8). R2P was endorsed unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the 2005 World Summit (Gallagher, 2012), and precedent for intervention set in Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter. As the nature of conflict in recent decades has evolved from predominately interstate to intrastate, characterised by a high number of civilian deaths (Weiss, 2012), the debate surrounding third party intervention has become increasingly salient. However, the legitimacy of an international body holding a sovereign state accountable for the abuse of its citizens remains a contested concept. As such the practice of R2P itself is contentious. Presently, there is no codified documentation outlining precisely when, where and how military intervention for humanitarian purposes should occur (Hehir, 2013). Some argue that this is a significant weakness of R2P, leading to multiple structural inconsistencies (Paris, 2014). Others counter that establishing R2P as international law would create a normative status, resulting in an increased frequency of interventions with potentially destabilising effects on the international system (Hehir, 2013).

The decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone is viewed as one of the most brutal in recent history, with subsequent British military involvement commonly cited as a positive model of humanitarian intervention and referred to as “Blair’s successful war” (Dorman, 2009). However, the term ‘success’ is often used uncritically and masks the debates surrounding this partisan, unilateral military action. This paper
critically reflects on the legacy of British military and non-military intervention for humanitarian purposes in the Sierra Leone civil war, situating the discussion within a R2P framework. Although it is acknowledged that this case study occurred in 2001, and therefore prior to the introduction of the R2P terminology, it is arguable that the essence of the concept pre-dates this branding, as historically military interventions utilising moral justifications occurred long before the introduction of the R2P slogan. For example, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 794, enabling the 1992 intervention in Somalia, utilised the word “humanitarian” 18 times (Weiss, 2012). In addition, the panoply of ethical ideals underpinning R2P and the desire to prevent further loss of life, were explicit in the British justification of their involvement in Sierra Leone.

It is important to note that there is a dearth of current research examining the long-term effects of intervention in Sierra Leone, with the majority of recent academic inquiry refocusing heavily on the role of diamonds in the creation of security, and the more recent Ebola crisis. As such, up-to-date explorations into the effects of intervention in the country are extremely limited. In addition, literature on military intervention for humanitarian purposes consistently focuses on a theoretical discussion of R2P and its short-term impacts, at a cost to a full analysis of the long-term effects. As a result, there exists a significant gap in knowledge. That almost fifteen years have passed since the cessation of widespread violence allows for scrutiny of the long-term legacy of this intervention, and its implications within Sierra Leone and British politics, as well as the wider impacts on discourse and intervention globally. As such this paper provides an overview, intersecting domestic politics,
foreign policy and global practice. Further primary research is also needed, in which the author is currently engaged.

**Background**

From March 1991 until January 2002 the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and counter-insurgency forces rampaged through Sierra Leone, in a civil war which became notorious for its atrocities and mass devastation. Initially, the RUF professed an ideological underpinning to the conflict; rooted in anti-corruption rhetoric, the desire to end the one-party political system, and the redistribution of wealth from elites to civilians. The backdrop of corrupt rule and widespread poverty add credence to the theory of grievance as the primary conflict motivator. Yet, in practice, the group did not seek popular support and their relationship with civilians was characterised by extreme violence (Humphreys, 2005). In addition, the RUF abused the “very resources it claimed were being squandered by the governing state” (Gberie, 2005: 9) through the looting and seizing control of the diamond fields, both to fund the continued conflict and for personal gain. Such actions imply greed to be the causal factor for the outbreak of widespread violence. However, the view that greed and grievance are dichotomous is reductionist and ignores the likely interplay both with each other and any additional socio-economic or historical catalysts for civil war. A thorough examination of the motivations for conflict is beyond the scope of this paper, and indeed literature has failed to reach consensus on the explanatory causes in relation to Sierra Leone (Peters and Richards, 2011). However, it is clear that the mixture of chronic poverty and insecurity, social, economic and political exclusion, combined with bad governance, created a situation fertile for the
emergence of violence (Goodhand, 2001). By the time peace was declared in 2002 approximately 70,000 people had been killed, nearly half the population were either refugees or internally displaced and a further 20,000 had been mutilated through amputation (Hoffman, 2004).

**Intervention in Sierra Leone**

Despite the extended duration of the conflict and reports of brutality, neither Britain nor any other developed country deployed troops as part of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (United Nations, 2009). Some, such as Dorman (2009), attribute this to a distrust of the competency of the assembled force, whereas others believe it to be a reflection of the limited political and strategic interest in the country, indicating a scepticism of the altruism associated with R2P. The consequence was a well mandated UN intervention with a weak, poorly equipped ground force which was not strong enough to implement it nor enforce an already frail peace agreement (Porter, 2003). This lack of credible threat, coupled with in-fighting between UNAMSIL’s component forces, resulted in numerous ceasefire violations and a continuation of violence. When the British military initially deployed in 2000, the focus was neither peacekeeping nor peace-enforcement, instead mandated only with the evacuation of British nationals from the territory. However, when RUF rebels captured 500 UN Peacekeepers, taking their uniforms, arms and vehicles, and subsequently attacking other UNAMSIL units, British forces intervened (Roberson, 2014). The incident further humiliated and undermined the peacekeeping attempts of the UN (Malan et al., 2003), and the legacy of their intervention came to be encapsulated in the Brahimi Report (2000). This assessed
the shortcomings of the mission and highlighted the importance of credibility in military intervention for humanitarian purposes, rather than simply the over-matching of indigenous combatants (Olivier et al., 2009). That the conclusion of the conflict came shortly after British military involvement has contributed to the perception of a successful intervention (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007), however, this action contains an undercurrent of controversy due to Blair’s failure to follow democratic custom and discuss military intervention in advance in Parliament (Marsden and Talbot, 2000).

British intervention in Sierra Leone contained an explicit state-building mandate, extending their directive beyond the short-term goal of ceasing violence and into peacebuilding activities designed to stimulate stability and sustainable peace (Paris, 2010). This long-term approach was exemplified in the UK’s unprecedented commitment to a ten year programme of support (Harris, 2013), and represented a marked step away from the approach to military intervention and peacebuilding witnessed in the 1990’s, where support was rarely extended beyond the first in-country elections following peace declarations. It is likely that this shift to a more holistic approach was a reflection of the legacy of earlier peace operations in countries such as East Timor, whereby short-term commitments proved to be myopic and resulted in the return of conflict, further loss of life, millions of dollars in wasted funds, and significantly undermined the credibility of the UN (Malan et al., 2003). As such, the British operation in Sierra Leone not only focused on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) but extended its remit to encompass features of democratic governance, including judicial reform, the rebuilding of infrastructure and reform of the market economy (Paris, 2010). Food security,
sanitation, the provision of water, education and health were also targeted for development (Fanthorpe, 2003).

**Legacy in Sierra Leone**

The long-term success of peacebuilding projects is significantly dependant on the establishment of infrastructure and its accessibility, yet in the case of Sierra Leone there was a severe underfunding of projects. For example, DDR programmes received less than half the funds required and it is estimated that more than a third of ex-combatants did not receive any support by the time reintegration programmes ceased (Olivier et al., 2009). Despite this, officials at the World Bank cite Sierra Leone as the “best practice example throughout the world of successful disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes” (Grant, 2005: 445). Thus, the true extent of this alleged ‘success’ can be questioned due to the subjectivity associated with the term. A weakness in implementation is also apparent following a more in-depth consideration of the security sector reforms, a key focus of the British intervention often referenced as evidence of its success. The security sector was identified as having a primary role in establishing sustainable peace within Sierra Leone and major training programmes were provided for former army officers, combined with ex-combatants from the RUF and Civil Defence Front (CDF). In providing armed personnel with a renewed purpose away from the political arena it was assumed stability would be created, increasing integration whilst decreasing attacks on civilians (Pickering, 2009). However, this approach failed to fully acknowledge the role all groups played in abuses and did not address the legacy of civilian distrust in the army which had been generated by the conflict (Harris, 2013).
In addition, it was not matched by political reform or a strengthening in the rule of law, which may create vulnerability to future conflict (Keen, 2005). Therefore, despite the label of 'success', and evidence of positive strides toward long-term stability, there are clear weaknesses in the execution of the security sector reforms and as such further analysis is needed of the domestic legacy in Sierra Leone.

Military intervention in Sierra Leone and subsequent state-building acted as a test case for liberal state rebuilding, in what Harris (2013: 155) terms a “well-intentioned but ideological experiment”. The resulting legacy is a democratic hybrid whereby liberal ideologies are merged with traditional alternatives previously evident in Sierra Leone. As such, democracy is not underpinned by the same liberal ideologies as in the West but by the continuation of patronage systems. For example, DfID funded programmes controversially reinstated the use of chiefs in a bid to strengthen local governance by “legitimate authority holders” (Fanthorpe, 2003: 62). Although it was felt that this partly addressed the grievances found in rural areas, which often operated in a governance vacuum, it also gave credence to patrimonial power structures. These lacked in transparency and had been previously known for abuses of power and generating feelings of marginalisation (Davies, 2000). Research suggests that a significant distrust of chiefs remains. Peters and Richards (2011: 377) refer to the tension between chiefs and youths as “endemic”. The resulting hybrid has not meant an end to forms of extraversion, rather that they have adapted to the new environment. For instance, paramount chiefs no longer arrive at villages with an envelope of cash for the village chief in order to secure their support. Instead they must arrive with five envelopes in order to accommodate the chiefs, the elders, the chiefs’ staff, the women’s group and the youth group (Harris,
Arguably, this is just one example and it is unknown how indicative this is of wider Sierra Leone, however, literature indicates that rather than encouraging liberal democracy the result has been the creation of a new system which has merely widened the net of patronage. As such, it is questionable whether the creation of such a hybrid can be referred to as a successful outcome of intervention, or whether the legacy created is in fact one which replicates the destabilising conditions associated with the causes of civil conflict, with the potential to intensify social tension (Bender, 2011).

At this point the notion of ‘success’ can be subjected to further scrutiny by focusing upon the criteria for assessment. For example, if the cessation of widespread physical violence is used to assess success, then it is undeniably evident in Sierra Leone. This is particularly significant when viewed in light of data which suggests that approximately half of the modern wars in Africa have restarted within a decade of cessation (Furley and May, 2013). In addition, relatively peaceful elections have been held, including a change in power, which is still an infrequent occurrence in post-conflict Africa (Harris, 2013). However, violence on a smaller scale continues and it is arguable that in order for the intervention to be deemed truly successful, then the criteria by which to measure it should be the satisfaction of all its aims, including state rebuilding objectives. Considering the vast amounts of money invested in the various projects, it seems logical that stability and development should be indicators of success. In other words, whether the root causes of violence have been adequately addressed and an improvement witnessed in social, economic, and political contexts in comparison to those which existed prior to the emergence of civil war. Indeed, research suggests that a return to the status quo
following conflict has a propensity to create an environment more unstable than that which existed prior to the outbreak of violence, not only due to the recreation of similar structures which may have been a cause, but also due to the heightened expectations created by intervention (Keen, 2005). In taking the wider aims of the British intervention into account its true success becomes less clear cut and one must examine the extent to which the current government is able to fulfil its economic and social functions; providing effective security and justice while channelling resources to civilians.

Currently, Sierra Leone is still experiencing challenges to maintain development and its indicators remain towards the bottom of the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2014). Many of the factors which contributed to the original outbreak of conflict continue to persist, such as poor governance resulting in political exclusion. High youth unemployment remains pervasive, with estimates suggesting that seventy-five percent of those under the age of thirty are unemployed (Maconachie, 2014). The “crisis of youth” is widely acknowledged as a contributing factor in the civil war, leading to large numbers of the marginalised joining armed groups as a means of self-empowerment (Fanthorpe and Maconachie, 2010). This indicates an existing situation of widespread social and economic exclusion with the potential to have a significant, destabilising effect. Similarly, the formal economy remains weak, despite being a key focus of peacebuilding efforts (Kawamoto, 2012), and the state has failed to gain full control of valuable natural resources. For example, despite a significant increase in diamond exports, it is estimated that hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth (US) are still illegally smuggled out of Sierra Leone per year (Grant, 2015). In addition, the government remains unable to
effectively deliver state provisions including power, sanitation and health; all of which were areas targeted by donor funding (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). The recent outbreak of Ebola provides an extreme example of the negative consequences of the continuation of under-developed infrastructure. Indeed, it is possible that had the Ministry of Health been better equipped to deal with the outbreak, and the outbreak itself been better managed, the spread of the disease may not have been as expansive. Whilst the state maintains the primary responsibility for the elements mentioned above, the extent of their accountability for these shortcomings is debatable. This is due to their dependence on external actors for assistance (Bender, 2011) and, at the time, on the peacebuilding mandate of the ‘successful’ British intervention.

**Legacy in British politics**

Blair consistently reinforced military action in Sierra Leone as a principled decision, underpinned by New Labours commitment to an ethical foreign policy, labelling Africa “the great moral cause of our time” (Bulley, 2010: 453). Some authors such as Holland (2012) have argued that military interventions during his premiership reflected a desire to play a leading role in the international arena, indicating motivations rooted in politics, neo-liberal ideology, and national interest rather than altruism. The desire to be perceived as acting on moral virtue is likely to have been further enhanced by the Sandline Scandal in which a British company was found to be breaching UNSC resolution 1132, which imposed an arms embargo on Sierra Leone (UNSC, 1997). Although the extent to which the British government were fully aware of these actions remains unclear, the incident caused national embarrassment
and political outrage due to the clear contradiction of its foreign policy. However, it perhaps helped stimulate Britain’s eventual commitment of troops in order to negate the damage to its credibility caused by the scandal (Gallagher, 2013), and as such there was an increased pressure on British action to be seen as successful. These paradoxical actions have led to the UK being labelled as the “villain of the conflict and hero of the peace” (Porter, 2003: 72).

Britain’s military intervention in Sierra Leone was the first to take place in Africa since the Suez crisis of 1956, and thus Blair was under enormous pressure for it to be perceived as successful. Similarly, although the military were deployed five times within the first six years of the New Labour government, Sierra Leone was the only unilateral excursion among these, thereby rendering the need for success all the more paramount (Dorman, 2009). Indeed, the more time and financial resources the UK invested in Sierra Leone “the less it could afford to be seen to fail” (Porter, 2003: 41). If the operation in Sierra Leone was to be perceived as a failure, the result may have been similar to Vietnam Syndrome experienced in America, inhibiting the prospect of future British military intervention, not just in Africa but globally. In contrast, the perception of a successful operation helped to cultivate the expectation of future success and served to increase Blair’s confidence in using the military for humanitarian purposes. Subsequently, Sierra Leone became a test case for ethical foreign policy and symbolic of a validation of the moralities underpinning R2P.

Prior to the civil war and intervention, Britain’s relationship with Sierra Leone was characterised by a colonial legacy and it is arguable that in some ways Britain continues to play the role of patriarch to the country. For example, after calls from Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General at the time, to intervene following the kidnap
of UNAMSIL troops (Olivier et al., 2009) Britain not only responded but became the largest bilateral donor of state-building projects (Malan et al., 2003). Some claim that by taking the lead in Sierra Leone a legacy was created whereby it was implicitly assumed that the UK would supplement projects which experienced a short fall in funding (Porter, 2003). That Britain once again appeared as one of the main donors and interveners in the country during the Ebola crisis may be seen as further evidence of this. Indeed, New Labours so-called ethical approach to foreign policy, solidified by the ‘successful’ intervention in Sierra Leone, has created a legacy within British politics which has transcended a change in governing party. For example, Cameron has echoed the underpinning sentiment from the Blair administration, though rebranded the commitment to human rights and freedom as “liberal conservatism” (Ralph, 2014: 11).

Global legacy

An abundance of R2P literature professes the importance of the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality within military intervention for humanitarian purposes. However, the British intervention in Sierra Leone operated with a clear demonstration of partiality for pro-government forces, despite their reputation for brutality, human rights abuses and use of child soldiers (Mazurana et al., 2004). Yet, due to its perceived ‘success’, it is continually cited by advocates of R2P as a positive example of intervention. In addition, the British intervention remained separate from UNAMSIL, choosing to work alongside them rather than comprising part of the UN force. As such, British forces operated without a UN mandate, which when coupled with the clear partisanship displayed, raises questions regarding the
extent to which the intervention in Sierra Leone should influence practice or be used as a model to scaffold future interventions. For instance, military interventions operating without impartiality leaves R2P vulnerable to criticisms of its use as a tool for “imperial nation building” (Paris, 2010: 345) designed to further the geo-political or ideological interests of intervening countries (Guiora, 2011). Where the clear violation of the principle of impartiality brings about regime change, as in Libya, intervention is likely to be perceived as a politically motivated conditionality rather than premised on the minimal security-based conditionality so typically associated with humanitarian principles (Pickering, 2009). This realisation risks creating a backlash internationally against similar interventions, and led both China and India to speak out against intervention in Syria (Paris, 2010). Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the intertwining of military intervention and peacebuilding within a liberal framework has weakened both the capability and credibility of R2P.

Certainly, there are those who argue that humanitarian intervention is inherently political as it is premised on a value judgment made by the international community. Often these judgments are underpinned by the perception of human rights abuses (Bulley, 2010), a principle which is itself rooted within a liberal ideological framework. This is not to say that non-democratic countries do not support intervention for humanitarian purposes, and the fact that Nigeria formed the backbone of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone may be viewed as evidence of this. However, although undeniably this was a military regime coming to the aid of a democratically elected government, these actions can still be seen as partially politically motivated due to Nigeria’s desire to police the region and avoid any
precedent which may be set through allowing rebels to seize power (Harris, 2013). As such, it may be naïve to suggest that humanitarian and political interests can be divorced from each other (Weiss, 2004), and perhaps in acknowledging an interplay between the two, a more realistic than idealistic vision of international relations is enabled.

Arguably, the perception of success of British action has set a precedent for future unilateral interventions, both by the UK and others, and risks establishing a pattern of acceptability for single states or coalitions outside of the UN to decide whether conflict-affected states have forfeited their right to sovereignty, as witnessed in the case of Iraq. Therefore, the role of the UNSC as both a legitimiser, and also limiter, of military intervention is undermined. As such, it is conceivable that there has been a decrease in the perceived authority of the UN and, some may argue, a downgrading of sovereignty within the international system (Holland, 2012). Non-UN sanctioned interventions also fuel the debate between illegality versus legitimacy and accountability, as those occurring without the authorisation of the UNSC may be deemed unlawful (Pugh, 2012). However, this reflection is far from simplistic as legality and legitimacy cannot be treated as synonymous, therefore it is possible for an intervention to be perceived as illegal yet legitimate. This is exemplified in NATOs intervention in Kosovo, vetoed by both Russia and China in the UNSC (1999), yet retrospectively acknowledged by some as justifiable action (Weiss, 2012). Similarly, legitimacy does not guarantee efficiency as following procedural norms and gaining approval from the UNSC creates significant delays (Ralph, 2014), therefore decreasing effectiveness and swiftness of action; both of which are imperative in terms of life-saving activity. Indeed, the intervention in Sierra Leone demonstrated a
stark contrast between the efficiency of the British forces in comparison to UNAMSIL. The legacy of this realisation may have contributed to the template for European defence, leading to the creation of thirteen deployable battle groups with the European Union able to respond quickly to small scale interventions or similar calls for action (Dorman, 2009).

Despite the shortcomings discussed throughout this paper it is arguable that the various interventions for humanitarian purposes in Sierra Leone have influenced the shape and structure of subsequent R2P interventions globally. Following Sierra Leone there has been a shift towards developmental peace missions, which aim to avoid a “shifting the burden” structure. This occurs where civil war stimulates action from international parties, who then address the symptomatic violence. However, by failing to respond to the underlying causes of conflict, such as a socio-economic underdevelopment, the solutions are often only short-term and disintegrate into renewed violence. This was evident in the early UN intervention in Sierra Leone, which witnessed the failure of numerous negotiated peace agreements (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). In contrast, the British intervention aimed to address development issues through a long-term peacebuilding approach, as theoretically by ensuring development the opportunity cost of a return to conflict is increased, thereby acting as a deterrent (Davies, 2000). As such, the British approach was designed to increase stability and break the cycle of conflict. Therefore, the implication is that in order for interventions to be successful they must embrace a broader, more holistic understanding of peace which moves beyond stopping the immediate physical violence through military deployment. This concept is encapsulated in the Brahimi Report (2000), which acknowledges the need for military
and civilian actors to better coordinate their efforts, rather than working separately, thus envisioning peacekeeping and peacebuilding as working together rather than as two separate ventures (Olivier et al., 2009).

However, some have challenged whether Sierra Leone represents an artificial example of a successful military intervention, signifying an ideal rather than the norm. For example, Dorman (2009) proposes that the British triumph was less a reflection of a panacea for intervention and more associated with the RUF representing an ill-organised rebel group pitted against a British commander with an extensive knowledge of the territory and the appropriate individuals. Whilst this raises questions about the value of the legacy in terms of the applicability of the lessons learnt subsequent interventions, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, have mirrored the approach used in Sierra Leone through the incorporation of aspects of state-building into the intervention mandate. Currently, a void exists in research examining the long-term effects of military intervention and the extent to which the responsibility to rebuild should be interlinked with R2P (Knight and Egerton, 2012) leading to a significant gap in both theoretical and practical knowledge.

Conclusion

Although vast amounts of money were pumped into Sierra Leone in an unprecedented ten year deal, and Britain was not the only external actor in Sierra Leone, it is important to remember that enormous interference is not synonymous with enormous success. The continuation of conditions similar to those pre-conflict suggests the term ‘success’ should not be applied to the intervention unquestioningly. Reports from Sierra Leone which may indicate the legacy of
intervention are at best contradictory, with stories emerging of sustained youth marginalisation and youth empowerment, continuing corruption and anti-corruption (Harris, 2013). However, a closer examination of the current situation in Sierra Leone highlights that there is a significant difference between pacification and positive peace. Within British politics a legacy of ethical foreign policy has been created which has transcended a change in governing party, and seen Cameron embrace liberal interventionism over the “poverty of realism” (Daddow and Schnapper, 2013: 333) which has characterised previous Conservative governments. In addition, a global legacy has been created which sees peacekeeping and peacebuilding increasingly intertwined, in an attempt to cultivate long-term stability. However, this shift adds to the controversy surrounding R2P through strengthening the connection between peace and political agendas.

In conclusion, intrastate conflicts have claimed the lives of more people during the 20th Century than interstate wars (Hehir, 2013) indicating that military intervention for humanitarian purposes remains a salient topic. However, there remains no clear blueprint on when intervention should occur and what shape it should take. Instead, each instance of intervention represents a guinea pig whereby the current paradigms are sought to be improved upon. Research examining the long-term effects of external interventions in internal conflict remains relatively sparse, and there is a need for further primary research into the various legacies created by these actions. In the current global context it seems unlikely that calls for intervention will cease and so there is an inherent responsibility for the continuation of practice to be accompanied by a full understanding of the effects of this social phenomenon. Without the existence of positive peace the true legacy of intervention in Sierra
Leone is called into question, as well as the validity of its influence in subsequent interventions. The self-perpetuating nature of successful intervention also warrants further research as had the case of Sierra Leone not been painted as such a victory, it is possible that Britain would have taken a different approach to successive military endeavours.
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